Alex Morris runs a portfolio of 10 to 15 stocks and reckons he has made about five changes to it this year. His largest positions run north of 10% of the book, and he publishes every change before he makes it.
The usual concentrated-investor story is about conviction. His is about restraint: the mistake he says he made as a younger investor was treating every 5% drop as a reason to buy more.
"So yeah, infrequent swinging, but also big swinging."
Morris spent roughly two years reading three decades of Berkshire Hathaway shareholder meetings to write Buffett and Munger Unscripted, and he would not start the project until Buffett's office told him it had no objection.
The full interview is covered here so you can skip it. 66 minutes of audio, 25 minutes of reading.
Here are the 16 lessons that matter.
👤 Guest: Alex Morris, author of "Buffett and Munger Unscripted" and writer of TSOH Investment Research, who spent about twenty years investing — most recently at a firm managing over a billion dollars — before going independent in 2021
🎙️ Host: David Barbato, who runs the Club Conversations and Business Breakdowns series at MicroCapClub and writes the Value Hunt research blog
📰 Published: 14 September 2026 on YouTube (MicroCapClub)
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Key Takeaways
Fixed wireless took two years to register, and by then the cable thesis was gone
He expects about 18 million US fixed-wireless customers by the end of this year
A cheap multiple is not a defense against a wrong thesis
He sold Comcast after roughly a decade at a low-teens earnings multiple, roughly flat
The fix for averaging down too fast was to wait, not to size differently
If a stock is down 5% a week after he bought it, he does nothing
Buffett's office gave the book a green light on one condition: don't imply he is part of it
Berkshire's hardest problems predate the succession and were not Buffett-shaped
Size, the cash pile, and lagging results at BNSF and GEICO
Buffett said in 2000 the internet would be a net negative for capitalists, and Morris thinks he was right
Price comparison ended the channel segmentation that branded goods were priced on
The biggest destroyer of value at public companies is one big acquisition
Dollar Tree paid $8 billion or $9 billion for Family Dollar in 2015 and sold it for about $1 billion
1. The Science of Hitting
Barbato opened by asking what the science of hitting is, because it is the name Morris publishes under.
The source is Ted Williams' book. Williams broke the strike zone into what Morris believes is 77 baseball-sized cells and set out what his batting average would be in each one, so the point of the exercise is knowing where your own sweet spot sits and what a pitch on the low outside corner would do to your average.
He came to it through Buffett, who used it more than 15 years ago to talk about waiting for a fat pitch.
Buffett's addition to Williams is the part that transfers to investing: there are no called strikes. With an 0-2 count Williams had to swing at the outside corner or his at-bat was over. "Investing you can wait for something that's really right down the middle to the extent that you're going to swing big."
Morris said he picked the name more than 15 years ago and thinks he lucked into a good one, given the other ideas he was considering. He is also a baseball fan, which helped.
Barbato said the explanation lost him, and offered a version for people who do not follow baseball: it is the difference between shooting from the top of the six-yard box and shooting from the edge of the 18.
2. Five Swings a Year
Asked how the metaphor translates into how he actually runs money, Morris described a portfolio built to make very few decisions.
The portfolio runs around 10 to 15 names, with the largest positions north of 10%. That is what he aspires to when a pitch is worth swinging at, rather than a constant state.
The counterpart is frequency. At TSOH Investment Research he discloses every portfolio change before he makes it, and guessed he had made something like five changes this year.
His framing sits in the same family as Buffett's 20-slot punch card: get to know companies over long periods, understand the business, get comfortable with the people and the strategy, and then act when something changes. The claimed edge is not analytical speed but history — knowing what a decision means in the context of everything that came before it.
What has changed with experience is the mechanics around the philosophy rather than the philosophy: averaging down, position sizing, and what diversification means inside a concentrated portfolio. The foundation, he said, is the same as when he started investing about 20 years ago.
3. Moving Down the Cap Scale
Barbato pointed out that Morris writes mostly about large companies while MicroCapClub is about small ones, and asked whether that is deliberate.
Morris called it partly an accident of where he worked. The most recent firm managed over a billion dollars when he left, which rules out a company with a $50 million market cap.
The other half was comfort. Established names felt easier to get his arms around when he was starting, which he was careful to say is not the same as being a better place to invest.
Since launching TSOH in 2021 he has been pushing deliberately toward smaller and earlier-stage companies, naming Fevertree and Vital Farms as examples of where that has already taken him, and Expel as the kind of name he would like to have found in 2016 or 2011 rather than in 2026.
On the direction of travel he was precise about which kind of small he wants: "Hopefully not companies that start big and get small to be clear. I want to find them starting small and getting bigger."
4. When Microsoft Got Expensive
Asked for a case study that worked, Morris gave two, starting with the position that shaped his philosophy.
He bought Microsoft in early 2011 and has held it since, a top-three or at worst top-five position for more than 15 years. It started as a conventional value investment, which is where he came into the business.
The decision that mattered was the one in the middle of the 2010s, when the stock stopped being priced as a value investment and started being priced optimistically — and a lot of traditional value investors got off the bus.
What kept him in was not the technology, which he was clear he does not follow to the detail, but the direction of travel plus the financial results, which told him directionally how large those businesses could get.
He also worked on the chief executive rather than only the company. He did a good amount of work on Satya Nadella, and said Hit Refresh, published around 2017 or 2018, made him appreciate him more than he already did.
The shift is the lesson he carries: "I felt really comfortable holding it in size and really betting on the business as opposed to just betting on its cheapness."
5. Dollar Tree at 10x EBIT
His second case study is a position he built recently, and the setup he described has three separate pieces that had to line up.
Retail is the hardest place to have an edge because you compete with everyone, and he made the point with the product sold at Dollar Tree that is also on the shelf at a regional Publix near him in South Florida, at Target and at Walmart. What differentiates the concept is how shoppers move through the store and the merchandise mix in it.
His objection for years was Family Dollar, which he did not think was a good asset — a second-rate competitor to Dollar General, a company he follows closely and owns. He wanted it gone so management could focus on the core banner.
The strategy also changed underneath. The price point went from a dollar to $1.25 because inflation compressed it, and the company moved to a multi-price model — a direction Dollarama in Canada had taken more than 10 years earlier, which gave him a case study to go back and study even though the retail environments differ.
Then the price came. In mid to late 2024, on his own numbers, he put the core banner at around 10 times EBIT. The stock has doubled in the two years since, and he still thinks it is attractive if the strategic evolution delivers.
His own grade on the trade is that he was not aggressive enough: "I think in hindsight, you could look back and argue that I should have been even more aggressive than I was, but I was fairly aggressive."
6. Let Time Be a Factor
Barbato asked how he handles a position that has trebled, and whether the work that went into knowing a company creates its own sunk-cost problem. Morris answered with the change he has made to how he reacts to price.
He does not re-rank the portfolio on a return calculation every day and adjust weights when one name moves 5% and another moves the other way. His objection is not that it is wrong in principle but that it is too cute, too mathematical, and guarantees he never owns anything in size for long.
The mistake he names as his own, particularly on value traps, was speed. "Something would go down 5% or even 10% on bad earnings, and I would see that as a buying opportunity." Another 5% down, buy again. Another 5%, buy again.
The correction is to let time be a factor on both sides of the trade. "If you bought something last week and it's down 5%, you don't need to buy it again this week." He can hold off a month or two.
He reframed what he used to think the objective was: "I need to buy at the bottom tick was almost like that's what I thought the objective was." Being right about the investment is what matters.
The test he now applies before adding is whether there is material new information since his last decision. "You're just pressing it for the sake of pressing it, right, as opposed to having reason to believe that the thesis is actually evolving how you think it should be in order to justify betting more."
Barbato observed that the uncomfortable outcome for most investors is not the slow 15% a year but the double in 12 or 18 months, which raises the question of what to do next.
7. The Comcast Mistake
Asked for the investments that went wrong, Morris again gave two. The first is the cable companies, and it is the one he says took him too long to see.
He bought Comcast in the middle of the 2010s, possibly 2014, on a stock that always looked optically cheap.
The first problem was the media side. He did not like what they were doing with NBCUniversal and Peacock and said they were dithering, not making the decisions they needed to make, and that the business got worse as a result whatever the short-term profit and loss said.
The broadband business had a record that made the deterioration hard to see. Comcast had 13 or 14 consecutive years of adding more than a million net broadband subscribers, on a base of roughly 30 million.
Then the wireless carriers pushed fixed wireless access, and the product won share while being worse on paper: slower downloads, cheaper, and — the detail he flags — better net promoter scores in third-party data than wired broadband.
His verdict on the industry's own framing: "Charter famously I think to this day calls it cell phone internet." For a product that scores better with customers than your own, he said, the name is revealing.
He is direct about his own lag. "I probably went through a period of 12 18 24 months where I didn't sufficiently appreciate what was changing didn't help that the companies didn't either." The cable industry believed the gains were a temporary tailwind that would hit a wall.
The scale is what settled it. He expects something like 18 million fixed-wireless customers in the US by the end of this year, against roughly 30 million broadband customers each at Comcast and Charter — a number he was careful to describe as relevant to that base rather than taken directly out of it.
The conclusion he eventually reached is the one that overrides a cheap multiple: "It doesn't matter that this thing is trading at, low teens multiple of earnings and with significant capital returns. My thesis was just wrong." He sold in late 2022 or 2023, roughly flat over an almost-decade holding, and said he should have been quicker.
8. Disney's $5B Hole
The second mistake came to him sideways: he owned 21st Century Fox and converted into Disney stock when Disney bought a large part of its assets.
The lesson is about duration and cost, not about the asset. "I didn't sufficiently understand or you know account for how long and how expensive it would be to get that business to where it needs to be."
His parallel is Walmart in the 2010s, which missed what was happening in e-commerce and then spent the better part of a decade investing to catch up with Amazon.
Disney+ launched in 2019 against a Netflix that had more than a decade of head start — and Netflix, he noted, burned a decent amount of cash through the 2010s itself.
He tracks Disney's video businesses as one profit line, and the swing is the number he gives: about $8 billion of earnings in 2018, down to about $3 billion at the lows two years ago. A $5 billion hole, held open for years.
What he would have changed is sizing and the pace of adding, not necessarily the decision to own it at all. Seven years into Disney+ there are green shoots in the profit line, but it legitimately took at least five years to get there.
The general rule he draws from it is about being long-term without being indifferent to the interim. Two questions have to be answered before accepting the wait: are you really sure the business ends up better, and what are you being paid for the years of pain. "You need to really get paid if you're going to be if you're going to be accepting that type of pain."
9. Always Fully Allocated
Barbato read a Munger quote from the book about 1973-74 being his one chance to buy and having almost no money at the time, ending with the advice not to wait for another one. Morris used it to explain why he does not hold cash against a market view.
His formative memory is the opposite of a crash. He graduated in 2011, and the sentiment then was that the post-crisis juice had been squeezed — he recalled Seth Klarman saying he thought it likely equities would deliver zero return over the following decade.
He has seen funds that ran 50% cash allocations in that period, and the market has compounded at mid-teens annualized rates in the 14 years since.
His own approach follows directly. "But for me, that is not the focus at all. I effectively run it fully allocated at all times." He believes in a sensible asset allocation set by age, income and savings rate, and nothing beyond that.
The caveat he allows is narrow: about 10 points of leeway either side. Someone whose allocation is 70/30 can run 60/40 if they think the market is expensive. Beyond that range, he said, you are playing a different game from the one where you analyze businesses and find 10 or 20 attractive opportunities.
On the macro generally: "It just really made clear to me that I think one can have thoughts at any given point in time about the attractiveness or lack thereof in the broader market." What matters instead is simple — "If you can go out and find interesting micro opportunities, that's all that matters."
He drew a line between a macro view and a macro trade. Bill Ackman, he said, has probably made good money on macro trades, but had access to vehicles that produce genuinely asymmetric outcomes. "That's a lot different than saying I'm going to burn 1% of my portfolio a year hedging against some specific risk that really pays off if I'm right." Sitting in 40% cash because the market looks overvalued is a different thing again.
10. Berkshire's Cash Problem
Barbato observed that Berkshire's own approach is micro even about the macro — the cash builds when nothing is worth buying — and Morris answered with a question from an annual meeting around 2010.
A shareholder asked whether it would make more sense to park Berkshire's cash in an index fund rather than leave it in cash, since holding it is arguably market timing itself.
Buffett's answer, as Morris recounted it, conceded the logic and then said size and liquidity make it impractical. Berkshire has signed deals over a weekend where the cash had to be there Monday morning, which does not work if the money is sitting in securities. He also raised the liquidity of getting in and out of funds at that scale.
Morris's reading is that even Buffett recognizes the two routes are different and that the cash route is not obviously the ideal one. His term for the risk on the other side is being underallocated, and he said the same applies in reverse: the risk runs both ways in large asset-allocation swings.
The conversation landed on scale as the binding constraint: a cash pile of $300 billion is hard to do anything with, and it is now Greg Abel's problem.
11. Greg Abel's Inheritance
Asked about the management change at Berkshire, Morris answered from having read every meeting.
Succession came up at every meeting going back to 1994 — three decades of shareholders asking what happens after Buffett.
The standing answers were two. Buffett's was that nobody had thought about it more or cared about the answer more than they had, and that they knew what they were looking for. The second was blunter: "And the second answer is something from Charlie, which is yeah, you're probably not going to get another Warren Buffett." If that is the bar, Munger's position was, you are going to be disappointed.
On Abel, Morris is positive and specific about why. "He seems like a very sensible choice to me in terms of his experience at Berkshire, in terms of how he can help to alleviate some of the capital allocation questions."
The visible change is candor. Abel is talking to shareholders differently about problems at BNSF and GEICO, where Morris said the willingness to discuss issues openly had become lax in the mid-to-late 2010s. He can appreciate why Buffett did not want to, but for the people paying close attention, and with those businesses lagging best-in-class peers, it had worn thin.
The point he ends on is that the hard problems are not new. Size, the cash and the issues at key operating businesses all existed three years ago when Buffett was chief executive. "So, it's not like Warren Buffett was the answer to those problems necessarily." They are now Abel's, and having reasonable expectations is the part to grasp.
Barbato added that fresh leadership brings a new set of eyes and a more operational profile, without expecting the change itself to fix anything.
12. Why Alphabet Surprised
Asked about Berkshire's recent Alphabet position, Morris put it against what the two of them said at the meetings.
The backdrop is Berkshire's IBM investment in the early 2010s, and specific meeting questions about Apple and Google in the same period. Buffett and Munger said in no uncertain terms that they did not have the confidence in the long-term trajectory of those businesses that they had in IBM.
"And Charlie said we'll never have that level of confidence."
The hindsight is the joke that tells itself: the Apple stake was at one point worth around $200 billion and created more value than probably any single decision in Berkshire's history.
On the Alphabet purchase itself, Morris separated who made the historic comments from who is making decisions now, and then gave his own view plainly: "I am a traditional value investor and am put off by paying high prices after markets have had nice long extended rallies." His added worry is the capital cycle — a lot of cash coming into the industry, and things running hot.
What he thinks could justify it is the relationship rather than the entry price. He allowed that there is a limit to what you would pay for relationship-building, but said a position like this is unusual for Berkshire to hold with Alphabet and may create the ability to put in significant further sums, particularly if the world gets choppier.
13. The Internet Cut Margins
One of the quotes read out from the book is Buffett in 2000, and it set up the longest single argument in the conversation.
Buffett's line: "I would say that on balance for society, the internet is a wonderful thing. For capitalists, it's probably a net negative." His reasoning was that plenty of things improve the efficiency of American business without making it more profitable, and that American business in aggregate was more likely to be worth less than it would have been otherwise.
Munger's coda: "By the way, that's perfectly obvious and very little understood."
Morris granted the obvious exception — the handful of mega-cap technology companies that created enormous value on the back of the internet — and then argued the rest of corporate America paid for it.
His first example is athletic apparel and the loss of channel segmentation. Twenty-five years ago a brand could price and discount differently in an outlet mall and a premium mall across town, and control who saw which price. Now a shopper can photograph a shoe and ask a language model where it is cheapest. "The competition level has risen."
The consumer packaged goods version is the collapse of television advertising as a moat. Owning the advertising once meant a branded macaroni and cheese faced only private label or a second-rate competitor; niche brands have since taken meaningful share.
His sharpest illustration is Disney's old shelf economics. A parent walking down an aisle at Walmart or Best Buy, or into a Blockbuster, would pay $12.99 or $15.99 for a DVD on the strength of the brand seal alone, because previewing meant driving back to the store. A $15 Netflix subscription makes trying any title free, so the barrier to sampling a competing product has gone.
The squeeze he sees across industries runs from both ends: premium claims taking the top — organic, gluten-free — and much better private label taking the bottom. His example is Kirkland at Costco, where quality is on par or better than branded offerings at roughly 30% less per unit. The middle is harder to defend every year.
His conclusion is that Buffett and Munger read it correctly: "The world increasingly gets more competitive and more difficult."
14. Getting Buffett's Blessing
Barbato asked how the book came about. The answer starts with a different book that Morris abandoned.
He had been writing a book on how to work with a financial adviser — what to expect, what to pay, what services an adviser can actually provide. Working through it, he got into financial planning, trusts, wills and retirement vehicles, and concluded that was neither his interest nor his expertise. His verdict on himself was that somebody else needed to write it.
When Harriman House approached him about writing a book, he told them he had just decided to stop writing the one he had. Shortly after, he came back with the idea that became Buffett and Munger Unscripted: going through the old annual meetings and organizing them by topic, in the vein of Larry Cunningham's The Essays of Warren Buffett, a book that got him interested in investing in his late teens.
He made the project conditional before he started. "So had that discussion with them, but I told them, I'm not doing this project unless Berkshire or Warren is okay with it." Not approval, in his framing, but being sure they did not disapprove.
His offer, put to Buffett's office in writing, was to give away half the proceeds: "I said, as part of the project, considering that their words are like 98% of the text, I'll give away half of the proceeds to Glide."
The answer came back a couple of days later from Buffett's assistant at the time, Debbie, and it carried exactly one condition: "Yeah, Warren says basically as long as you don't suggest that he is involved with the project in any way, you're okay to go ahead."
His reaction: "Oh crap, now I have to actually do this."
What followed was an 18-month to two-year process of writing and editing the whole thing.
15. Where Value Gets Destroyed
Asked what remains underappreciated about Berkshire after three decades of meetings, Morris named capital allocation and the incentives built around it.
What comes through the meetings is how much weight both men put on the clarity of a company's capital allocation policy, and on the incentive structure set for the managers of Berkshire's own subsidiaries. He said it is treated as so much of what determines the value of a business over time.
"This idea that is so much of what determines the value of a business over time, effective and sound capital allocation."
Reinvestment inside a business is usually legible — the return on building the next store is knowable. Where it goes off the rails at public companies is mergers and acquisitions, and to a lesser extent buybacks.
His worked example is the same retailer he owns. "Again, picking Dollar Tree as an example, they paid $8 billion or eight or nine billion to acquire Family Dollar in 2015. They sold it a few years ago now or 12 to 18 months ago now for a billion dollars." He put that against a company with a market capitalization of roughly $20 billion as he was writing, and noted the figure ignores the opportunity cost in between.
For a minority investor with no influence over those decisions, the work is done in advance, and he listed the questions: "How does management communicate what their strategic priorities are in capital allocation? What does their track record show? Are they honest about their mistakes? How frequently are they doing big chunky acquisitions?"
The reason it matters for a long-term holder is that the day always comes. If you intend to own a business for years, at some point management will make one of these decisions, and you want to have established first whether the person making it is aligned with you.
Barbato brought up a related passage from the book, in which Buffett works out how much a company would have to earn pre-tax to justify a $500 billion market capitalization at a 15% return — an argument that it can be acceptable to buy a company earning below its potential, while the math gets harder the further out you push it.
16. Ten Minutes, Nine Decades
Barbato put the popular image to him: Buffett looks at a company for ten minutes and knows what it is worth. Morris said it is true where the industry is one he already knows.
Retail is the clearest case. Buffett has owned Walmart stock and owns the Nebraska Furniture Mart, so on a company like Dollar Tree "he could probably tell you in five minutes what he likes and dislikes and how he thinks about valuing that company."
Something like Precision Castparts, where the question is the relationship with a customer like Boeing and how that works, took longer — at least at the time.
The general point is accumulated pattern-matching rather than speed. Morris counted eight decades of it, or nine if you take Buffett's own starting point at six years old, and said the odds are good that any company you name is one he has already heard of.
On how Buffett valued companies at 30 or 40, Morris put him in the Ben Graham hard-asset tradition: "Well, my sense would be that he came out of the Ben Graham style more hard asset value." The question was what it could truly be liquidated for tomorrow, which is a different calculation from valuing a going concern.
He also said the liquidation play is harder now than it was. Munger has talked about a business in France where you think you own the working capital and the real estate, and then discover the government will not let you shut it down and sell it off. Morris put the Washington Post somewhere between the two methods: partly a multiple of earnings power, partly what the hard assets were worth.
The See's Candies story is his example of how the experience compounds. Buffett and Munger were haggling over the last 5% or 10% of the family's asking price, and someone close to Munger told them they were being foolish — it was a very good brand needing very little reinvestment, and it would be a home run at that price. Buffett has since said explicitly that what they learned from owning See's led directly to the Coca-Cola investment in the late 1980s.
Morris's closing observation on that is that investing is a game where age is not much of a handicap — somebody can do it as well at 75 as at 25, and most likely better.
Bonus Insights
Morris said he would not be opposed to finding the next Expel in 2016 or 2011 rather than 2026, and that the constraint is building the muscle to find companies that small.
Barbato said he did not follow the baseball explanation and would go and learn the rules afterwards, which produced the soccer version of the analogy for an international audience.
On the transition out of a traditional job structure, Morris dated his independence precisely: TSOH launched in 2021, so he has been outside the institutional structure for five years.
The conversation closed the technology thread on whether professional analysis is itself at risk — whether a business will still need an accountant, or whether a narrowly trained model that knows the business better than anyone could do most of the accounting and legal work. The two joked about fallback careers if equity analysts get automated.
Morris does not think the 2010s cash-heavy funds have recovered the argument. Some will say the last 15 years were unique because of the Federal Reserve and a long list of other reasons; his answer is that 15 years have gone by regardless, and a professional making that call is probably not managing money any more.
Barbato's framing of Buffett's advantage in an era of language models: he has had all the data in the world in his head for decades.
Morris's bottom line is that a concentrated portfolio survives on patience rather than conviction — waiting for the pitch, refusing to add just because a price fell, and accepting that the expensive mistakes are the ones where a cheap multiple kept him in a business whose competitive position had already changed.
Products, Companies & Tools Mentioned
Berkshire Hathaway (The subject of his book, and the source of the capital-allocation framework he says is the most underappreciated part of it)
Microsoft (Bought in early 2011, a top-five holding ever since, and the position that moved him from betting on cheapness to betting on a business)
Dollar Tree and Family Dollar (His current case study: he wanted Family Dollar gone, and bought the core banner at about 10 times EBIT in mid-to-late 2024)
Dollar General (A company he follows closely and owns; his benchmark for why Family Dollar was a second-rate asset)
Dollarama (The Canadian retailer that ran the multi-price playbook more than 10 years before Dollar Tree, giving him a case study to study)
Comcast and Charter Communications (The mistake he regrets being slow on; each with roughly 30 million broadband customers as fixed wireless took share)
Peacock (Part of the NBCUniversal strategy he said Comcast was dithering over)
Disney and Netflix (The streaming transition he underestimated: Disney's video profit fell from about $8 billion in 2018 to about $3 billion, against a Netflix with a decade's head start)
Walmart (His parallel for Disney — a decade of catch-up investment after missing e-commerce)
Costco (Kirkland is his example of private label at or above branded quality for roughly 30% less per unit)
Alphabet and Apple (The two companies Buffett and Munger said they would never have IBM-level confidence in; the Apple stake was later worth around $200 billion)
IBM (The technology holding they did have confidence in, in the early 2010s)
Fevertree, Vital Farms and Expel (The kinds of smaller companies he has been moving toward since going independent)
Precision Castparts (His example of a Berkshire acquisition that took Buffett longer to get comfortable with, because of the customer relationship with Boeing)
See's Candies (The purchase where haggling over the last 5% or 10% nearly lost the deal, and the lesson that led to Coca-Cola)
Coca-Cola (Where the See's lesson was applied in the late 1980s)
Nebraska Furniture Mart (Part of why Buffett can assess a US retailer in five minutes)
Glide (The San Francisco charity Morris offered half the book's proceeds to, because Buffett has supported it for decades)
Books & Resources Mentioned
The Science of Hitting – Ted Williams (The book behind his research service's name: the strike zone split into 77 cells, each with its own batting average)
Buffett and Munger Unscripted – Alex Morris (Three decades of Berkshire annual meetings reorganized by topic; half the proceeds go to Glide)
The Essays of Warren Buffett – Lawrence Cunningham (The model for his own book, and one of the books that got him interested in investing in his late teens)
Hit Refresh – Satya Nadella (Deepened his read on Microsoft's chief executive while he was holding the stock through its re-rating)
TSOH Investment Research (Where he publishes his portfolio and discloses every change before he makes it)
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