https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HKAk0XSiN0I
Tom Nelson, who runs asset allocation portfolio management at Franklin Templeton Investment Solutions, walks through how an institutional multi-asset portfolio is actually built — what the money is for, where the guardrails sit, and what he thinks investors get wrong about diversification and about risk. Andrew Horowitz spends the first third of the show on the Treasury's long-bond buying, the dollar, Nvidia's quarter and the state of the strategic petroleum reserve, and says he is rewriting client portfolios into year-end.
👤 Guest: Tom Nelson, head of asset allocation portfolio management at Franklin Templeton Investment Solutions
🎙️ Host: Andrew Horowitz, CFP, of Horowitz & Company
📰 Published: 30 August 2026
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Key Takeaways
A good diversifier is supposed to let you down sometimes
"a good diversifier should actually occasionally disappoint clients. And if it never does, it's probably not diversifying enough"
When a client asks why they own the one position that is not working, "sometimes the answer is that's precisely why we own it"
Diversification is not owning a lot of things
It is owning things that respond differently to the same economic outcome — stocks and high-yield bonds are different securities that share one exposure
The portfolio starts with what the money is for, not with asset classes
Return target, time horizon, liquidity, and the difference between the losses a client permits and the losses that produce a phone call
Risk is the portfolio failing to do the job it was hired to do
Volatility is one measure of that, not the definition of it
A 60/40 mandate can move ten points either way and still be a 60/40
Equities 50 to 70%, bonds 30 to 50%, so the fund a buyer purchased is still the fund they own
Twenty years on the objective is identical and the toolkit is unrecognizable
The conversation moved from stocks, bonds and alternatives to growth, inflation, duration, liquidity and volatility
"I am not convinced that we've reduced the time required to make a bad decision"
Horowitz calls the Treasury's long-bond buyback Operation Twisted, not Operation Twist
The original had the Fed creating money and adding to the pile; this one only changes where the debt is issued
The announcement moved rates for about four days
Pushing long yields down without touching the deficit makes the pressure surface elsewhere
Lately that has been the dollar, and with it gold, silver, copper, palladium, oil and Bitcoin
Horowitz thinks the debasement trade in gold and silver is misguided
The dollar is weak because the rest of the world reads the debt and the strategy as problematic, not because the Treasury is printing
Nvidia's quarter is now judged as a referendum on the whole AI build-out
The AI story is real, and so is the spending on data centers, chips, power and servers
Four or five funds is not diversification when the top ten holdings of each are the same six stocks
That concentration has worked for years, which is not the same as working forever
Most of the strategic petroleum reserve sits in underground salt caverns that have operating limits
Draw them too low and the walls become hard to maintain and the facility becomes unusable
Horowitz is rewriting client portfolios into year-end after two years of a value tilt worked
"portfolios should look different going into the end of this year than they did coming into it"
Horowitz Is Rewriting Client Portfolios Because the Setup That Worked Has Already Changed
Horowitz opened by telling listeners he is making changes — "And some of these changes could become fairly significant as we move throughout the rest of this particular year" — and that the reason is not a forecast and not a coming market event.
For years the winning portfolio needed no thought: own US stocks, especially large-cap technology, hold bonds for diversification, and skip international, which lagged for years while the dollar was strong
What changed is a list rather than a single event: interest rates, fiscal policy, a dollar that has come in over the last few weeks, and valuations that are stretched in places
He is explicit that this is not a call to abandon what worked, which he said "would just be dumb""You stay with what works. But right now it's more about the recognition of the idea that our portfolios they need to evolve."
His analogy is a steak on a grill: "You don't just put a steak on the grill and just let it cook for the half hour." Move it to the cooler side, turn it, get grill marks on it — everything does not need tinkering, but it needs attention
The claim the whole show is built on: "we think we're about to be entering into one of those periods where portfolios should look different going into the end of this year than they did coming into it"
On the volume of work this is generating in what should be a quiet season: "We have piles of portfolios." Many are sent in by listeners for review, and the question is usually the same — why am I not keeping up with the markets when I have owned this for five years
Operation Twist Without the Fed Is "Operation Twisted"
The host's own view of the Treasury's move to buy back longer-dated debt and lean on shorter-term issuance is that the label is wrong and the effect is small. "Let's just put it this way. It's Operation Twisted. That's what it is."
The precedent does not fit. The original involved the Fed, which was "creating money out of thin air and then putting it into the idea of buying longer bonds versus shorter buying a lot of them. It wasn't just this idea of twisting from what we already have. It was adding to it."
On the durability of the announcement effect: "we're going to buy, I don't know, $4 billion worth of long bonds on a monthly basis that impacted interest rates for a total of about 4 days"
He put it in the same category as the yen episode a few weeks earlier — a "well-placed piece of paper buy 10 billion of the yen was put on a table just in the eyesight of camera lenses", which moved the currency for a couple of days and then gave roughly half of it back
What the Treasury is trying to reach is mortgages, corporate borrowing, real estate, government financing and anything else tied to the cost of money
The cost-of-capital squeeze he says is already biting private markets: "The assumption was they're going to have maybe a 5%, 4% cost of capital. Now it's 6 to 7%." That spread, against a four-to-seven-year holding period, is what he called distress in private equity and private credit
On the government's own arithmetic: "the amount of debt we have 40 trillion is the number we have right now and with that amount of debt that the government has to finance every move higher in rates becomes extremely expensive"
Push Long Yields Down Without Fixing the Deficit and It Bulges Somewhere Else
Horowitz conceded the Treasury can improve liquidity in parts of the market and can push rates around a little. What he does not accept is that any of it addresses the cause.
His framing is a diet: "It's like a diet. You could be like, well, I'm going to eat better food, but if you eat the same amount and even more of it, does that help anything?"
"I don't think there's a clever financial trick that markets will accept and make this whole problem disappear because markets generally figure this stuff out"
Where the pressure goes instead: "It's just pressing on a balloon one way and we get this expansion, this bubble, this tumor somewhere else."
The place it has shown up lately is the US dollar, and with it Bitcoin, gold, oil, silver, copper and palladiumHe said the dollar backing off "deserves more attention than it's getting"
The Debasement Trade Is Misguided, Because the Dollar Is Weak for a Different Reason
This is the host's sharpest disagreement with the consensus he sees in the research and the commentary.
"Now, the gold situation, by the way, I think is currently misguided. I think the gold and silver just for the moment is misguided."
The reasoning: the Treasury's buyback is not quantitative easing and is not creating further debasement, so a trade premised on debasement is premised on something that is not happening
What he thinks is actually happening is that excess debt and "a lot of the strategies that we're doing as a country" are read as problematic by the rest of the world, and the dollar is weakening because the US looks weaker from outside
Why that matters for allocation rather than for trading: a weaker dollar changes the attractiveness of international assets, can help commodities, and can change the return from owning anything outside the United States
He was careful about the trigger for action: you do not make major portfolio changes because of the dollar, or because of a bad week. You act when valuations, interest rates, fiscal policy, currency trends and relative performance start lining up at once
This is his case for active management over a static index position — not that passive is wrong, but that there are periods when staying in the same allocation makes complete sense and periods when it does not
Nvidia's Quarter Is Now a Referendum on the Whole AI Build-Out
Horowitz said he and John Dvorak covered this on DH Unplugged, the other podcast he co-hosts, and that the run-up was overdone — "a big market event that's going to happen. It could be make or break it. There's a this whole nonsense that you heard, right?"
The stock dipped after the print on a few concerns, then recovered on the scale of the revenue gains the company laid out through 2028
"And Nvidia put on about 450 billion dollars in market cap on the next day."
What the market is really pricing off the print: "it's not just about Nvidia beating anymore" — investors are reading the numbers as the verdict on whether all of the AI spending still makes sense
He does not dispute the underlying story: "the AI story is real. There's no question about that" — alongside an enormous amount of money going into data centers, chips, power, servers and infrastructure, with prices going through the roof
Dell, SanDisk and Micron came up as beneficiaries, and he said the list of names goes on
What makes each tech report matter now is not the company reporting but what it says about spending by the megacap techs, the hyperscalers, the data centers and the energy providers
Four or Five Funds Is Not Diversification When They All Own the Same Six Stocks
This is where the host tied the Nvidia discussion back to portfolio construction, and it is the strongest version of his own argument in the monologue.
Many investors believe they are diversified because they hold several different stocks or several different funds
Look at the top five or ten holdings of those funds and ETFs and the answer is the same list every time: Nvidia, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Meta and Google
"you could still have a very concentrated portfolio and that's worked very well for a number of years, but that doesn't mean it's going to work forever"
On what is actually leading this year: he pointed to large-cap growth lagging, and to small caps, emerging markets, international markets and commodities "beating the pants of many of these areas"
His conclusion is speed-limited rather than dramatic — "That's why you want to be able to bob and weave a little bit. Doesn't mean you need to do things very quickly" — and the open question is whether a change like this is a canary in the coal mine or noise
The Oil in the Strategic Reserve Sits in Salt Caverns, and the Caverns Have Limits
The second DH Unplugged story, and the one the host later admitted got him most animated. Most people picture tanks, tankers or barrels; the reserve is mostly held in enormous underground salt formations in Louisiana and Texas.
Reserves have been drawn down substantially, in particular over the five months since the war, to levels the US has not seen in decades — he cited a discussion putting the level back where it was three or four decades ago
The draw-down is being used to keep prices down at home and abroad, and other countries are seeing significant declines in their own reserves
On why the oil is being used at that rate: "the Strait of Hormuz is not open. Can we just get that straight?"
He told listeners to check it themselves rather than take his word for it, by pulling up a Strait of Hormuz ship tracker and reading the AIS transponder data — every ship broadcasts its identity, speed, size and position"Nothing is in the Strait of Hormuz" at the narrowest part of the passage"Don't take my word for it. Go look yourself. There's nothing fake about this."
The part that is not about the oil price at all is the storage itself. The caverns need maintenance and have operating limits on how far they can be drawn down; below a certain level the walls dry out, begin to crumble and the facility becomes difficult to maintain and eventually unusableHe was open about the limits of his own expertise here — "I guess I'm not an expert in this"The consequence is that the reserve has to be held at a decent level to stay usable at all, which is a constraint separate from how much oil is left
The investment angle he drew out of it: energy, the dollar, interest rates and international markets all feed back into how a portfolio is designed
A Value Tilt and a Softer Dollar Are What Made the Difference
Closing the monologue, Horowitz gave the record behind his own call, and he was careful about what he means by a trend: not two or three months, but a multi-year trend that may be changing.
His firm has carried a value tilt for at least two years, particularly in large cap, and held it while growth and tech were outperforming
"the outperformance by value has been astonishing" over the last twelve to eighteen months, and it helped portfolios do extremely well
Adding emerging markets and softer-dollar trades on top of that was, in his words, a game changer for the portfolios
He said the team has spent the better part of a week reimagining what client portfolios should look like into year-end, and expects more changes before the year is out
Nelson: Too Early to Call the Treasury's Long-Bond Buying, and the Bond Market's Worry Is Fiscal
Asked whether the move is classic yield-curve control or a targeted form of quantitative easing, Nelson would not pick — "it's a little early to tell. But it's interesting."
His team was already writing a piece on where yields sit relative to the last couple of decades, in the US and in Germany, Japan, the UK and France
In hindsight he thinks it should have been less of a surprise than it was, given what the bond market has been signaling
On what is driving yields: inflation, "but probably more importantly, fiscal deficits, right?", plus a desire from the administration "from the top on down for lower interest rates"
He read it as a first move — "we'll see if there are more behind it" — to relieve stress on the long end
The host's framing of the awkwardness: the long end is not the Fed's usual instrument, its first impact is on the short end, and Fed chair Warsh has told the bond market to do the heavy lifting. Horowitz's reaction was that challenging the bond market may not be the best idea in the world, because the vigilantes can come back
Who the Bond Vigilantes Actually Are
Pressed on who the vigilantes are, Nelson gave the only honest answer available.
"Not by name. But it's your traditional large players within the fixed income marketplace, be they asset managers, pension funds, other central banks, etc. But they're kind of I guess they have a name, but they're certainly faceless."
The Process Starts With What the Money Is For, Not With Asset Classes
Horowitz set this up with his own history — Harry Markowitz, William Sharpe, Brinson, Hood and Beebower, and years spent on computer-assisted modeling of the efficient frontier — and with the moment he stopped. If a 1% position rises 20%, that is 20 basis points on the portfolio. "What am I doing? What am I, what is the point of all this?"
Nelson's answer inverts the order most people work in.
"we really start with the objective and not the asset classes"
The questions come before any allocation decision: "first off, what's the money for?" Then the required return, and whether it is expressed in absolute terms or against a benchmark; the time horizon; the liquidity needed
The distinction he draws that most risk questionnaires miss is between the ability and the willingness to tolerate drawdowns: "what sort of losses does the client actually allow and what sort of losses lead to uncomfortable conversations and a phone call from the client"
Income requirements, taxes and other constraints come next, and only then the capital market assumptions and the portfolio construction
The labels are not what is being allocated: "you're not really allocating amongst asset class labels these days. We're really focused on allocating amongst economic exposures"Equities for growth and participation in corporate profitability; government bonds for income, liquidity and diversification when growth is the dominant concern; credit for contractual income with a different profile from equities; real assets for inflation protection; alternatives for differentiated return streams; cash for liquidity
Strategic Is a Ten-Year North Star, Dynamic Runs Six to Twelve Months
Asked what time frame the capital market assumptions run on, Nelson made the joke that working for Franklin Templeton invites — "maybe we could say we used bifocal vision", playing off Ben Franklin — and then gave two clocks.
The strategic allocation is a 7-to-10-year horizon, called a 10-year time horizon, and it is more valuation-oriented, because valuations can stay out of line for years and are still a good tool for long-term decisions
The dynamic tilt runs 6 to 12 months and is centered on growth, inflation, policy, sentiment and positioning
The quadrant logic: is growth good or bad, and is it getting better or worse — with distinct historical returns by asset class in each"When things are bad and getting worse, you want to be a lot more defensive. You want to reduce your equity exposure more and into more defensive assets like fixed income, particularly treasuries."
The host's own version of the tilt is a driver swerving around a car on the highway and then returning to the lane: an interim adjustment that does not change where you are ultimately going. Nelson agreed with that reading
A 60/40 Mandate Can Move Ten Points Either Way and Still Be a 60/40
Horowitz raised the constraint an institutional manager works under and an individual does not — the investment policy statement, with allowable ranges, minimums and maximums, against a retail investor who might let one stock become 30% of a portfolio.
On a moderate-risk mandate: "we'll use the 60/40 example 60% equities 40% fixed income you could potentially deviate plus or minus 10% from those neutral or those strategic weights"
"So equities can be anywhere from 50 to 70% and bonds can be anywhere from 30 to 50%."
The point of the band is that the product stays the product: the overall risk level and characteristics remain similar enough that "when investors purchase say a mutual fund that we might manage they're getting what they're expecting to get"
Horowitz's arithmetic on why the tilts look small: a 10% overweight in a position that outperforms by 10% over the period is a 1% bump on the portfolio — modest for an individual, and a large number for a manager tracking a benchmark
Information Ratio Is What Nelson Measures, and What Horowitz Says Is Badly Named
The measure is active return per unit of active risk. "if we're taking 2% active risk and we generate 2% incremental return, that's an information ratio of one, which is quite solid". Generate the same 2% on 10% of active risk and the number is much lower and, in his words, less impressive
The host's objection is to the name, not the metric: "information ratio is a terrible name for that. Just saying." He suspects most listeners have never heard of it
What it actually asks, in his own words: how different are you from your benchmark, and how much return did you get from being different
He put betas, alphas and Sharpe ratios in the same category — extraordinarily important when choosing funds and choosing the advisers inside a portfolio, and largely ignored by investors going for pure return
The cautionary tale he reached for was GT Global, the fund family that was "all the rage" with its emerging-market products and is not around any more, and he named Cathie Wood in the same breath"investors chase them stay too long and then a lot of times get burned on the back end"
Tactical Is Just a Shorter Clock Than Dynamic
"Depends on who you ask. There are a lot of folks that use those two interchangeably."
Franklin Templeton's own usage: "We would generally view tactical to be shorter term than dynamic." Dynamic at 6 to 12 months, tactical at one to three
Nelson's position is that the difference, if there is one, is only the time horizon — his team tends to focus at the longer end
The host's reason for caring: stacking a core allocation with a dynamic process and possibly a tactical layer covers near-term, mid-term and long-term opportunities at once. He was blunt that a 60/40 portfolio is a "big yawn" to an audience that wants to hear about the next biotech or the next AI takeover
No Asset Class Is Banned; Risk That Cannot Be Priced Is
Asked directly whether anything is a permanent do-not-touch, with crypto set aside, Nelson declined the premise.
The firm tries to "cast a wide net and offer access to a broad swath of asset classes", and it is client constraints that rule things outA portfolio with a demand for high liquidity and a short horizon is not the place for private equity, private capital or private real estate
"We're less interested in categorically avoiding an asset class than avoiding risks that we can't easily price, that aren't adequately compensated for taking or are, as I mentioned, inconsistent with client objectives."
"almost every asset can have a role at the right price in the at the right time in portfolios", provided the return is commensurate, the strategy is tradable, and the complexity is paid for
Two disqualifiers he named outright: "We don't want leverage that's masquerading as diversification", and a strategy whose historical return depends on a single economic regime, which he said is not a great thing to hold across a full cycle
The host's illustration ran both ways: an 89-year-old who needs income and liquidity does not belong in a private equity placement, and a 30-year-old with no need for the money does not belong in a stable-value or money-market allocation either
The All-Weather Portfolio Is Boring, and Boring Works
Horowitz brought back a phrase from an earlier era and his own standing analogy for it — a Florida flower garden. Plant impatiens and only impatiens and "if we plant impatiens and it's summertime, they're dead. They'll bloom beautifully January through March or so", leaving stems, sticks and dirt for the rest of the year. He wants evergreens in there too — stable value, in the portfolio version — so that something is in bloom at any point in the year.
"I think so. It's maybe a little bit boring but boring works, right?"
The definition Nelson gave is the one worth keeping: "it doesn't mean that everything works all the time. It means that something and hopefully multiple things should work all the time in the portfolio"
The construction is the same quadrant map: growth strong or weak, accelerating or decelerating, inflation high or low, accelerating or decelerating — then holding assets that should do well at different points of each cycle
What that buys is not return, it is shape: a much more steady and predictable return stream over time, which is where the all-weather name comes from
A Detour Through Bloomberg's Relative Rotation Graphs
A short aside, and the only stretch where the host was doing the explaining and the guest was confirming.
Nelson spent time at Bloomberg before Franklin Templeton, and Horowitz asked whether he had a hand in building the relative rotation graph — RRG — which plots the velocity of a move against the outperformance
Nelson confirmed the axes and nothing more
The use Horowitz described: feed in the S&P 500 sectors and watch which is performing well but losing its mojo, and which is suddenly making a move — "It's like a horse race. That guy's on the outside, number seven's on the outside and he's coming in and he's taking over."
Diversification Means Owning Things That Respond Differently to the Same Outcome
Asked for the one principle of portfolio construction he would teach advisers and investors, Nelson named diversification, and then disagreed with the usual definition of it.
A lot of people think diversification means owning a bunch of different things. "we think that diversification means owning things that respond differently to the same economic outcome"
Stocks and high-yield bonds are different securities that share a substantial exposure to economic growth, so a pile of high yield does badly exactly when the economy does
Public and private equity have very different liquidity profiles and often the same fundamental economic engines behind them
"Long duration treasuries and short duration credit to that point they're both fixed income but they can behave completely different during an economic shock."
The second failure he sees constantly is evaluating positions instead of portfolios. Clients ask why they own the asset that has not performed well recently, and "sometimes the answer is that's precisely why we own it"If everything is working at once, there is a reasonable chance everything is exposed to the same underlying factor"a good diversifier should actually occasionally disappoint clients. And if it never does, it's probably not diversifying enough"
Horowitz matched it with two stories of his own: an institutional equity manager whose first act every morning is to work out which of his holdings is the biggest dog, and a client asking why they own a position that is not doing well — over four days, when the rest is up, rather than over six monthsHis point is that a portfolio always has a worst performer, and that being the worst performer is not by itself a reason to remove it
Risk Is the Portfolio Failing to Do Its Job, Not Just Volatility
Horowitz asked which risk measure the firm actually uses — downside volatility, standard deviation, correlations, information ratios, alphas and betas by sector — and noted that correlations have narrowed since the financial crisis, so the old rule that stocks up means bonds down no longer holds reliably.
The answer was all of the above, with a caveat on the most common one: volatility measures how much the portfolio moves around, and "We would say that it's a measure, one of many measures of risk"
"Risk in many ways for us is that the portfolio fails to do the job that it's hired to do" — so the metrics are tied to the objectives agreed with the clientThat can be falling short of a benchmark, losing money, or simply not generating enough return over time
Value at risk asks, in a bad case — "like the worst 5% of the time, what would your portfolio potentially lose?" Conditional value at risk asks what the average loss looks like across that same tail
Hit rate — how frequently the portfolio meets its objective — matters because some clients want steady and predictable outcomes above all
Up and down capture ratios: how much of the market's rise the portfolio captures, and how much of the fallHorowitz's read on why that pairing matters: two portfolios can arrive at the same place, and the one that took less of the downside got there far more smoothly
The ideal Nelson described for a multi-asset portfolio is a high hit rate, positive asymmetry between upside and downside capture, and positive skewness — "when the strategy outperforms it outperforms to a higher degree or to a larger extent when the strategy underperforms"
Horowitz's practical note for listeners is that most of these tools are not available outside Morningstar and a few similar places, but the calculations are return-based, so daily, weekly, monthly or annual returns in a spreadsheet will produce most of them — and, he added, AI is now an obvious way to do it
Twenty Years On, the Objective Is Identical and the Toolkit Is Unrecognizable
The last question was what has changed in two decades of doing this.
The job has not moved: "we're still trying to assemble a collection of assets that give investors the highest probability of achieving their goals. Full stop."
The intellectual shift is from asset classes to risk factors. Twenty years ago the discussion was stocks, bonds and alternatives; today it is "growth, inflation, duration, liquidity, volatility, and other risk premia"
The investable universe has exploded: ETFs are far more prevalent, private credit has come into vogue over the last couple of years, private equity is much more available to the average investor, liquid alternatives exist, and systematic strategies are "kind of all the rage" and heavily used by his team
The unit of construction has changed too, from funds to direct securities or sleeves of underlying strategies — which he flagged as double-edged, because it "creates more opportunities to also build unnecessarily complicated portfolios"
Alternatives moving from institutional portfolios into wealth portfolios is a positive with a bill attached: liquidity, valuation, capital calls, portfolio construction and manager dispersion
Technology transformed implementation — lower trading costs, better transparency, information traveling almost instantly"faster information hasn't necessarily created better investors""we've reduced the time required to obtain information from, in some cases days and weeks to milliseconds. I am not convinced that we've reduced the time required to make a bad decision."Horowitz's reply: "there's always plenty of time for that"
Nelson's bottom line is that the portfolio is built backwards from what the money has to do rather than forwards from a menu of asset classes, and that the test of whether it is genuinely diversified is whether some part of it is reliably disappointing at any given moment; Horowitz's is that the conditions that made a concentrated US equity portfolio the right answer have already changed, and that the Treasury cannot fix the long end without touching the deficit.
Products, Companies & Tools Mentioned
Nvidia (Posted the quarter the whole market was waiting on, dipped, then recovered on the revenue gains it laid out through 2028; Horowitz says the print is now read as the verdict on all AI spending)
Dell, SanDisk and Micron (Named as beneficiaries of the data center, chip, power and server build-out, with infrastructure prices going through the roof)
Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Meta and Google (With Nvidia, the names that turn up in the top five or ten holdings of fund after fund, which is why owning several funds is not diversification)
Franklin Templeton Investment Solutions (Nelson's employer; the multi-asset business whose objective-first process, 60/40 guardrails and 10-year strategic horizon are the subject of the interview)
Bloomberg and its relative rotation graphs (Where Nelson worked before Franklin Templeton; RRG plots the velocity of a move against outperformance, and Horowitz uses it on S&P 500 sectors)
GT Global (The emerging-market fund family that was "all the rage" and is no longer around — the host's example of a flash in the pan investors chase and stay in too long)
Cathie Wood (Named in the same breath as GT Global as the modern version of the same pattern)
Morningstar (One of the few places an individual can find hit rates, capture ratios and similar statistics on a fund or strategy)
The US Strategic Petroleum Reserve (Held mostly in underground salt caverns in Louisiana and Texas, drawn down to levels not seen in decades, with maintenance limits of its own)
Books & Resources Mentioned
DH Unplugged (The podcast Horowitz co-hosts with John Dvorak; he says both the Nvidia discussion and the salt-cavern story came out of this week's episode)
A Strait of Hormuz ship tracker (He told listeners to look up the AIS transponder data themselves rather than take his word that nothing is moving through it)
The episode's AI-generated show notes for the guest segment (A PDF the show publishes alongside each episode, covering the Tom Nelson interview)
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